Reductionism about Tense
Completeness and Explanatory Metaphysical Semantics
Thorben Petersen
Sider (2011) and Skow (2014) argue that a complete description of reality can be given from an atemporal perspective. In both cases, the surprising conclusion is meant to follow from the conjunction of (1) reductionism about tense, (2) completeness and (3) explanatory metaphysical semantics, namely:
This talk consists of three parts. I will begin by providing a brief history of reductionism about tense, and locate the Sider/Skow-view in logical space. In the second part, I argue that the Sider/Skow-view should be rejected. This is because the set of propositions consisting of (1), (2) and (3) implies
which, on any reasonable interpretation of ‘being explanatory’, is a proposition that is false. Finally, I shall argue that this conclusion is (i) not in favour of dynamical theories of time, show that (ii) the phenomenon of tense can only be explained by taking into account that enduring substances change and (iii) motivate what it means to deny that a complete description of reality can be given from an atemporal perspective.
References
Sider, Theodore (2011): Writing The Book of The World. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Skow, Bradford (2014). Objective Becoming. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Reductionism about tense: Temporally indexical sentences have tenseless truth-conditions
- Completeness: A description of reality is complete iff every non-fundamental truth (or fact) is made true (or holds in virtue of) a non-fundamental truth (or fact)
- Explanatory metaphysical semantics: Fundamental truths (or facts) are explanatory as of non-fundamental truths (or facts).
This talk consists of three parts. I will begin by providing a brief history of reductionism about tense, and locate the Sider/Skow-view in logical space. In the second part, I argue that the Sider/Skow-view should be rejected. This is because the set of propositions consisting of (1), (2) and (3) implies
- Illumination: Tenseless sentences are explanatory as of the contents of tensed statements,
which, on any reasonable interpretation of ‘being explanatory’, is a proposition that is false. Finally, I shall argue that this conclusion is (i) not in favour of dynamical theories of time, show that (ii) the phenomenon of tense can only be explained by taking into account that enduring substances change and (iii) motivate what it means to deny that a complete description of reality can be given from an atemporal perspective.
References
Sider, Theodore (2011): Writing The Book of The World. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Skow, Bradford (2014). Objective Becoming. Oxford: Oxford University Press.